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Abstract
This chapter reviews fundamental legal principles relating to groundwater quan-
tity and quality in the United States, Australia and the European Union. It also
examines legal approaches to three key “integration” challenges in groundwater
law, which arise in relation to many of these foundational principles. First,
groundwater law must deal with the relationship between groundwater and
surface water—specifically, how abstraction of one should be controlled due
to impacts on the other. A second and related challenge is making legal provision
for integrating groundwater with its environment, that is, making legal provision
for ecological water requirements. Finally, legal frameworks face the significant
challenge of dealing with groundwater management in the cross-boundary
context. By comparing and contrasting approaches to common and burgeoning
legal challenges across different regions, this chapter seeks to highlight the
key issues that regulators and groundwater users must consider and confront in
dealing with them, and a range of potential legal solutions.
7.1 Introduction
Despite their many differences, Australia, the western US and Europe, and indeed
major regions of the world, all rely on groundwater as an important water source for
cities, agriculture, and ecosystems (Chap. 2). Their systems of groundwater law—a
powerful tool for controlling access to groundwater, groundwater depletion, and
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pollution—have proven to be useful for each other to consider, as well as for other
nations worldwide (e.g. Garry 2007; Grafton et al. 2009; Thomas 2009; Folger
2010; Ross and Martinez-Santos 2010; Nelson 2011a). This chapter describes key
aspects of the groundwater law systems of these three regions and the ways in
which they deal with key emerging challenges, both as a guide and a caution to
areas facing similar issues. In most countries, groundwater regulation has typically
proceeded in “laissez faire mode” (Kemper 2007). But as varying combinations of
population growth and its associated industry and agriculture, climate variability,
and water quality challenges threaten groundwater in many places of the world
(e.g. Bates et al. 2008), the importance of legal tools for dealing with these issues
increasingly will come to the fore.
This chapter is structured in three parts. Part One deals with the fundamental
legal nature of groundwater, and ownership of groundwater. Part Two describes key
differences in the levels of government responsible for regulating groundwater
quantity, and introduces key approaches to controlling the extraction of ground-
water at two levels: the macro, or basin scale, and the micro scale of individual
rights. This part also deals with four key emerging challenges in the context of
groundwater extraction: permit- or licence-exempt wells; the emergence of a
human right to water; integrated management of groundwater with hydrologically
connected surface water and dependent ecosystems, and integrated management
across political jurisdictions that share the same water source. These groundwater
quantity issues have been particularly dominant in the legal discourse of the western
US and Australia, where water scarcity is common and competition for water is
high. Lastly, Part Three deals with groundwater quality protection, a regulatory
concern in relation to both point-source pollution and, increasingly, diffuse sources
of pollution.
The approaches taken in the western US, the EU and Australia to the ground-
water law issues discussed here vary richly, not only in terms of the legal principles
and tools available, but also in the extent to which they have developed and
matured. The fundamental aim of this chapter is to highlight several key emerging
issues that regulators, in particular, must consider and confront in groundwater
management, and a range of potential legal approaches to these issues.
We draw on examples from each of the three focus regions in each part of the
chapter, but in each part, emphasise the experience of jurisdictions in which the
subject issue is particularly critical. Accordingly, in describing groundwater quan-
tity concerns, we emphasise the experience of the western US and Australia,
presenting these first; and in describing groundwater quality concerns, we empha-
sise the experience of the EU and the western US, presenting these first.
A final note: a comprehensive treatment of groundwater law, and notable
subjects within it, lie outside the scope of this chapter. These include legal aspects
of groundwater monitoring, trading, enforcement, pricing, managed aquifer
recharge, stakeholder involvement in management, and non-regulatory aspects of
groundwater law, such as private legal actions.
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7.2 Envisioning Groundwater in Law: Its Nature
and Ownership
7.2.1 What Is Groundwater, for the Purposes of the Law?
Different legal systems conceive of groundwater differently. The way in which
groundwater is defined is of central importance in groundwater law. Too narrow a
legal definition can unduly constrain the reach of the law, putting important
resources beyond its control. An overly broad definition could complicate adminis-
tration of the law if it means that permission is required to undertake activities
affecting resources that are not, in fact, subject to concern about depletion or
contamination.
Definitions of groundwater vary along several dimensions. Key points of differ-
ence include whether the definition includes water in the unsaturated zone, as well
as in the saturated zone of the soil profile; whether it includes saline water or only
freshwater; whether there is a depth limit to the water that is considered “ground-
water”; the extent to which the definition includes things that are associated with
groundwater, like the aquifer structure; how to distinguish surface water and
groundwater where they are subject to different allocation arrangements; whether
to distinguish between naturally occurring groundwater and groundwater that has
been “artificially” stored using managed aquifer recharge; and how different
administrative units of groundwater are defined. While these issues are too numer-
ous to discuss in detail here, some examples of this variation are given here to
illustrate notable approaches.
Law plays a unique place in defining groundwater in western US states—
because the legal view can differ so radically from the scientific view. Some
western US states draw complex, narrow legal distinctions between different
legal “types” of groundwater, treating some groundwater (often called
“percolating” groundwater) differently to groundwater that is closely connected
to a river (often called “underflow”, “subflow” of a surface stream, or “underground
streams”). These distinctions bear no resemblance to geological reality (Klein
2005). Different allocation regimes and rules can apply to each legal “type” of
groundwater, and the geographical boundaries of these types are rarely clear. This
can result in a troublesome lack of clarity about exactly what legal regime applies to
groundwater in a particular location—confusion that may only be able to be
resolved through extensive technical studies or litigation (Sax et al. 2006).
Among the regions under discussion here, arguably the broadest definition of
groundwater is found in Australia’s federalWater Act 2007. That legislation defines
“ground water” as “(a) water occurring naturally below ground level (whether in an
aquifer or otherwise); or (b) water occurring at a place below ground that has been
pumped, diverted or released to that place for the purpose of being stored there; but
does not include water held in underground tanks, pipes or other works”. “Water
resources”, which are the basis of administrative planning units, are defined
extremely broadly to include, among other things, “ground water”, an aquifer
whether or not it currently has water in it, and “all aspects of the water resource
7 Groundwater Law 175
(including water, organisms and other components and ecosystems that contribute
to the physical state and environmental value of the water resource” (sub-section 4
(1)). The broad definition of groundwater clearly includes water artificially stored in
aquifers using managed aquifer recharge, and the broad definition of water
resources clearly indicates the importance of dependent ecosystems, including
those that depend on groundwater, within the Australian federal water governance
framework.
Within the European Union, the EUWater Framework Directive (adopted by the
Council representing EU Member States and the European Parliament) provides a
framework for water management, including groundwater. It should be stressed that
each country of the 28 EU Member States must transpose EU directives into their
national laws but that the practical implementation remains each nation’s responsi-
bility. The WFD defines groundwater more narrowly than does Australia’s federal
Water Act, as “all water which is below the surface of the ground in the saturation
zone and in direct contact with the ground or subsoil” (Article 2, item 2). The
Directive also refers to a “Body of groundwater”, which is a distinct volume of
groundwater within an aquifer or aquifers. This volume is generally used to define
administrative reporting units. Some Australian states take a similar approach, for
example, defining groundwater as comprising only underground water in aquifers
(e.g. sub-section 3(1), Water Act 1989 (Victoria), Schedule 4, Water Act 2000
(Queensland)).
7.2.2 Who Owns Groundwater?
The difficulty of conceiving of ownership in relation to water has been noted in very
disparate jurisdictions as well as at the international level (Burke and Moench 2000;
McKenzie 2009). Ownership of groundwater can be an emotion-charged issue: on
the one hand, it is closely connected to land and ownership of land; on the other, it is
often vital for public water supply systems and supporting ecosystems of high
public value. In some places, groundwater has historically been treated very
differently to surface water in relation to questions of ownership and allocation
because its flowpath is less obvious, and even “secret” and “unknowable” (Klein
2005). This view was considered to justify the traditional English common law rule
of absolute ownership of groundwater by overlying landowners, which was
imported to both the US and Australia (Klein 2005; Gardner et al. 2009). Today,
however, it may surprise some to know that across our three diverse focus regions,
public or government ownership of groundwater is the norm, though principles for
allocating it differ markedly between jurisdictions.
In the western US, with a few exceptions (as in Texas, where the English
common law rule of absolute ownership still stands), the public as a whole owns
the water and the state is its trustee. In other words, the state has a non-proprietary,
regulatory interest in groundwater (Surett et al. 2013). A landowner generally has a
proprietary right to use the water underlying the land, rather than ownership of the
water itself (Surett et al. 2013). The question of whether water rights are property
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rights is not completely settled, however (e.g. Ross-Saxer 2010). Different states
use different systems of allocation, relying on a variety of principles and procedures
contained in statues and judge-made law. The doctrine of prior appropriation,
which applies in most western US states, gives greater reliability to groundwater
rights that developed earlier in time, rather than treating uses as generally equal in
reliability and subject to correlative reductions in reliability in conditions of
scarcity. Other systems are “correlative” groundwater rights among overlying
landowners in California and Nebraska; and absolute ownership in Texas (Chap-
man et al. 2005). Judicial allocation necessarily involves court processes, and
litigation has the potential to be lengthy and expensive—though this is not always
the case, particularly where courts are used to formalise water rights in a basin, to
which the parties have already agreed out of court.
Australian law also has its origins in the English common law, originally giving
overlying landowners absolute, almost unrestricted rights to own and extract the
resource. Legislative changes then vested groundwater in the Crown, and
introduced a system of administrative regulation, under which the Crown grants
individuals the right to use groundwater. Common law rights were generally
abolished (Gardner et al. 2009). In some cases, statutes expressly sought to avoid
the extensive water rights litigation that were perceived to occur under western US
judicial allocation processes (Clark and Myers 1969). Rights to use groundwater in
Australia are now generally considered property rights. Indeed, the creation of a
highly regulated property rights system for water is an express premise of two
decades of celebrated Australian water reforms aiming to improve economic
efficiency and environmental sustainability (Gardner et al. 2009; McKenzie 2009).
Similar to Australia, in the EU, the entitlement to use groundwater (owned by the
State) is given by public authorities through licences and permits which are issued
for varying periods of time in different states. These are, however, not considered
private property rights, but rather rights to exploit the resources in compliance with
legally binding rules.
7.3 Controlling Groundwater Extraction
Establishing what groundwater is and who owns it is just part of the task of
groundwater law. Its main function is to manage groundwater quantity by setting
limits on total extraction to achieve a variety of objectives, and by controlling
extraction as between individual users, in many cases by assigning individual rights
to extract. The first step towards doing that is to decide what level of government to
entrust with those regulatory tasks. The experiences of Australia and the EU show
varying degrees of supra-state (federal and EU, respectively) involvement and
coordination in certain high-level aspects of groundwater policy and law, but
allocating water to individual users remains uniformly the task of lower levels of
government. In the western US, the federal government has almost no formal role.
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7.3.1 Who Regulates Groundwater Quantity?
Different jurisdictions allocate responsibility for regulating groundwater differently
as between local, state and federal governments. Broadly, the locus of responsibility
for groundwater quantity regulation reflects the general degree of acceptance of
centralised government in each region, with responsibility tending to lie higher in
government hierarchies in the EU and Australia and lower in the western US.
Western US states are generally responsible for regulating groundwater quantity,
though in some states (as in Nebraska and most regions of California), this role is
assumed by local governments. The federal government is directly involved in
groundwater quantity concerns to a much lesser degree, for example, through
funding mechanisms (Leshy 2008b).
Until very recently, Australia approached groundwater quantity regulation in
much the same way: states had carriage of water allocation issues, and federal
influence was felt mainly through funding mechanisms. However, after over a
decade of federal water policy driven by economic incentives offered to the states,
the federal Water Act 2007 introduced a much more direct federal role. This is
particularly so in the Murray-Darling Basin, an agriculturally and ecologically
critical basin the size of France and Spain combined. Under arrangements that are
yet to come fully into effect, the federal government sets Basin-wide limits on
surface water and groundwater extraction, while states continue to allocate water to
individual users within those overall caps.
In contrast to western US states (among which there is no coordination on
groundwater quantity administration) and Australian states (among which there is
coordination in policy, through the National Water Initiative, but relevant over-
arching law only in the Murray-Darling Basin), the EU’s Water Framework Direc-
tive more strongly coordinates the regulation of groundwater quantity among
Member States by establishing goals and planning processes in supra-national
law. Actual water allocation is carried out by different authorities and agencies at
different levels.
The issue of regulatory responsibility aside, the key substantive function of
groundwater law is to manage groundwater extraction to achieve particular
objectives. This can occur at both a macro- (i.e. basin-) scale, or at the level of
individual rights to extract the resource. Though not discussed here, another focus
of groundwater quantity law is requiring well spacing to control interactions
between wells, and regulating well construction methods to prevent pollution.
7.3.2 Macro-Level Controls: Establishing Groundwater Withdrawal
Limits Through Plans and Other Means
Jurisdictions use a variety of principles for establishing overall (e.g. basin-wide)
withdrawal limits that restrict the allocation of groundwater rights—concepts like
“safe yield” (western US), “good groundwater status” (EU), and “environmentally
sustainable diversion limits” (Australia). In some cases, these overall withdrawal
178 R. Nelson and P. Quevauviller
limits are established by management plans—an approach strongly favoured in
Australia and the EU.
In most western US states, there is a weaker focus on overall basin extraction
limits than in Australia or the EU, perhaps because of the absence of a water
planning tradition (Chapman et al. 2005), and reliance on a common law tradition
of water allocation. A disadvantage of the western US common law approach in
contrast to Australia’s water allocation planning approach is the relative difficulty
of changing vital concepts like the principles that limit extraction, and how those
principles are exercised in a particular year, to match changing water availability
and also the modern recognition of the environmental water needs of groundwater-
dependent ecosystems (Pilz 2010).
Walnut Creek Intensive Groundwater Use Control Area, Kansas
In the middle of Kansas, Cheyenne Bottoms lies on one of the busiest,
globally significant shorebird migration paths. During their spring migration,
about 45 % of North America’s shorebird population, up to 600,000
individuals, use these wetlands, which are the largest in the interior US. By
1989, groundwater pumping to support the agricultural economy surrounding
the wetlands had depleted Walnut Creek, the source of a surface water right
held by the Kansas Department of Wildlife and Parks to water the wetlands.
They were completely dry during the height of spring migration (Hays 1990).
In response to these effects, the Kansas water rights administrator, the State
Engineer, took the unprecedented step of declaring an “intensive groundwater
use control area” and establishing rules to ban new groundwater pumping, cut
back on existing groundwater rights, and introduce a “cap and trade” system
for irrigation water rights. At the time, farmers predicted that groundwater
pumping restrictions would have devastating economic effects. However, a
2011 economic analysis suggests that the initially significant economic
effects of these rules diminished rapidly, so that in the long-run, producers
made the same amount of money from crops while using less water (Golden
and Leatherman 2011).
Where they exist, water plans in the western US tend to be used as water supply
planning tools “designed to insure that adequate water is available for certain kinds
of uses” (Wadley and Davenport 2013) rather than tools for setting basin-scale
limits on water allocation. California provides an example of this approach: the
California Water Code provides for various kinds of water management plans,
including groundwater management plans, but these generally do not affect ground-
water allocation (Nelson 2011b). Some western US states that have made recent
changes to their groundwater management regimes have introduced the concept of
water plans that are capable of constraining groundwater allocation to within
cumulative caps (as in groundwater planning processes that aim to achieve “desired
future conditions” in Texas (Witherspoon 2010)). Some other western states have
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water plans that affect groundwater allocation in a few designated groundwater
areas that are recognised to require special management (e.g. Intensive Ground-
water Use Control Areas in Kansas (Sophocleous 2012; and see text box)). In some
eyes, a water planning approach is highly controversial, interpreted as an attack on a
“pure” prior appropriation system, where seniority and “beneficial use” are the
major determinants in allocating water (Wilkinson 1991).
Rather than using a planning mechanism, western US states tend to express
overall extraction limits through state statutes and sometimes through judicial
precedent, though on occasion neither is particularly clear. Some western US
state statutes explicitly limit extraction to “safe yield”—roughly, constraining
groundwater extraction to the level of natural and artificial recharge (e.g. Arizona
Revised Statutes section 45-561(12), 45–562)—or some variation of that concept.
However, as a technical concept, safe yield has been discredited as a management
tool capable only of protecting against groundwater over-exploitation, since it
ignores discharge points at surface water bodies and ecological users of ground-
water (Alley et al. 1999). Some states increase or decrease the allowable extraction
above or below the level of recharge by qualifying the concept of safe yield to
include other aspects, for example, those related to economics and water quality
impacts. In Washington, safe yield prohibits the state from granting appropriative
rights beyond the basin’s capacity to yield water within a reasonable or feasible
pumping lift in case of pumping developments, or within a reasonable or feasible
reduction of pressure in the case of artesian developments (Revised Code of
Washington } 90.44.070). In Utah, safe yield means extracting the amount of
groundwater that can be withdrawn from a basin over a period of time without
exceeding the long-term recharge of the basin or unreasonably affecting the basin’s
physical and chemical integrity (Utah Code Annotated } 73-5-15). Generally
speaking, however, environmental considerations in relation to groundwater quan-
tity (i.e. seeking to maintain some portion of natural basin discharge that supports
ecosystems) have not yet become a prominent consideration in setting basin-scale
limits on extraction in the western US.
In Australia, macro-scale extraction limits are set by statute, usually through
legislatively prescribed water planning processes. Broadly, two major goals of
national water policy are “to increase the productivity and efficiency of
Australia’s water use . . . and to ensure the health of river and groundwater systems
by establishing clear pathways to return all systems to environmentally sustainable
levels of extraction.” (Preamble, Intergovernmental Agreement on a National
Water Initiative). National assessments of the progress of states in achieving
these goals have repeatedly found shortcomings in relation to groundwater, how-
ever (e.g. National Water Commission 2009, National Water Commission 2011).
Australian water statutes generally cite both environmental and socio-economic
objectives (e.g. section 3, New South Wales Water Management Act 2000). They
limit extraction in a basin to a level that reflects a combination of environmental and
economic principles, with the balance between the two varying depending on the
jurisdiction. The federal Water Act 2007 gives an example of an environment-led
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limit: under that legislation, a legally binding federal management plan for the
Murray-Darling Basin requires states to ensure that aggregate groundwater
pumping does not exceed “sustainable diversion limits” set to reflect “an environ-
mentally sustainable level of take” (section 23). Key elements of that term, how-
ever, remain undefined in the legislation, and have been the subject of contestation.
By contrast, the state of Victoria provides for “permissible consumptive volumes”
to be set for groundwater administrative units without detailing the criteria to be
applied to set these limits (section 22A, Water Act 1989), and they have not
traditionally been set with regard to ecological water requirements. While
Australian jurisdictions strongly emphasise the value of pre-planning acceptable
extraction volumes, and constraining allocation through licences accordingly, some
states do not impose allocation plans and general controls on groundwater extrac-
tion in basins that are only lightly exploited, preferring to wait until more intensive
exploitation occurs before undertaking the technical work necessary to nominate
extraction limits (e.g. prescribed water resources in South Australia: sections
76, 125, Natural Resources Management Act 2004).
In the EU, the Water Framework Directive sets a groundwater quantity goal of
achieving “good quantitative status” for all water bodies by 2015. This will be
achieved if the long-term annual average rate of abstraction is compensated by the
aquifer recharge. This definition is complemented by principles that go beyond
traditional “safe yield” concepts. The status definition also implies that the abstrac-
tion should not lead to alterations in flow directions which would result in saltwater
or other intrusion. In addition, the level of groundwater should not be subject to
anthropogenic alterations such that it would result in failure to achieve the environ-
mental objectives (good chemical and ecological status) for associated surface
waters, any significant diminution in the status of such waters, and any damage to
terrestrial ecosystems which depend directly on the groundwater body. The policy
framework opens the possibility for the Member States to use artificial recharge,
providing that this does not jeopardise the quality of the groundwater.
As a general observation, to a greater or lesser degree, depending on the state,
there seems to be a general movement towards basin-wide withdrawal limits that
take some account of the impacts of extracting groundwater on the environment.
This is quite a historical shift, which has generally mirrored the inclusion of such
considerations in earlier surface water frameworks, or in a few cases occurred
alongside it. This shift is proving much more advanced in Australia and the EU,
at least on paper, than is the case in the western US, where often highly developed
environmental protections for surface water are not replicated in relation to ground-
water. The ease of modifying overarching principles through statute- and water
plan-based processes may be one factor explaining this. Another might be the
political difficulty of constraining economically important and water-intensive
agricultural sectors in the western US, which have a much greater dependence on
groundwater than does agriculture in most European countries or Australia (van der
Gun 2013).
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7.3.3 Micro Level Controls: Rights, Entitlements and Licences
Other than through basin-scale limits on extraction, the other major way in which
groundwater law controls groundwater pumping is through rights, entitlements and
licences at the scale of the individual groundwater user. Most jurisdictions within
our focus regions require a person to obtain a right or entitlement to extract
groundwater for particular end uses in all or many geographic areas. Notable
exceptions to this are California and Texas in the western US, which do not
generally require that a person obtain a permit to use groundwater, even for very
large uses, except in small geographic areas. The requirements to obtain a permit or
licence to use groundwater, and the processes involved, vary quite dramatically
among our three focus regions, as well as within them (Patrick and Archer 1994;
Bryner and Purcell 2003; Chapman et al. 2005; Gardner et al. 2009).
Western US groundwater allocation regimes tend to focus on a relatively narrow
range of considerations that emphasise the human, rather than the environmental
impacts of extracting groundwater. When considering an application for a permit,
western US decision-makers commonly must consider: whether water is available
for appropriation, the possibility of impairing existing rights, the applicant’s ability
to put the water to immediate beneficial use, public interest considerations, which
are often undefined, and water conservation considerations (e.g. Idaho Code }
42-203A). A third party usually has strong rights of review; often, they not only
have the right to protest a licensing decision, but in doing so, trigger a public
hearing on the matter (e.g. Idaho Code } 42-203A, Montana Code Annotated }}
85-2-308, 85-2-309). However, mirroring arrangements in relation to basin-scale
extraction limits, in very few jurisdictions are environmental matters explicitly
mentioned as a groundwater permitting consideration (e.g. Montana Code
Annotated } 85-2-311(3)(b)(vi), Idaho Administrative Code } 37.03.08.045(e)(ii);
North Dakota Century Code, } 61-04-06(4)(c)), and in any case, it appears that these
matters are rarely considered with great rigour in practice.
By contrast, Australian legislation tends to produce long lists of matters that a
decision-maker must consider in determining whether to grant a licence, with a
heavier focus on environmental impacts. A key consideration is whether granting
the licence would be consistent with any applicable overall consumptive limit for
the area or applicable management plan (e.g. section 147, Natural Resources
Management Act 2004 (South Australia); section 40, Water Act 1989 (Victoria)),
which may itself contain further location-specific considerations relevant to licens-
ing. Additional statutory considerations relate to the impacts on third parties of
granting the proposed right to extract, and impacts on elements of the environment,
such as water quality; water conservation policies; impacts on the aquifer structure
(e.g. sections 40, 53, Water Act 1989 (Victoria)); and impacts on connected
resources, discussed further below. Opportunities for the public to be involved in
the issuing of groundwater licences—and the emphasis that agencies place on this
form of participation—are often relatively limited, with most of the focus of public
participation being at the water planning stage (Nelson 2013). This may be prob-
lematic where the effects of extracting groundwater—particularly ecological
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effects—are very localised, and likely able to be anticipated only by locals. Local-
scale groundwater-dependent ecosystems (GDEs) are unlikely to have been cap-
tured in macro-scale planning processes, and are not guaranteed to be addressed by
centralised decision-making (Nelson 2013). Recent efforts to map GDEs at a fine
scale (Bureau of Meteorology (Australia) 2013) may go some way towards
addressing this danger by making this information easily available to decision-
makers and the public.
The relative paucity of western US legal arrangements in relation to water
planning, basin-scale caps, and even the brevity of permitting considerations can
be explained in part by its very different conception of the role of time, compared
with Australia. Rather than focusing heavily on prospective caps or groundwater
permitting considerations, western US groundwater law deriving from prior appro-
priation principles controls the impacts of groundwater extraction primarily by
looking backwards. That is, it seeks to avoid over-pumping by curtailing the
exercise of a groundwater right that has been found to impair an earlier water
right. Dangers with this approach lie in the political difficulty of reducing
established uses, and dealing with the time lags that can separate ceasing to pump
groundwater and the remediation of adverse impacts.
In the EU, authority to pump groundwater is generally given through permits
that refer to the quantity of water abstracted and/or pumping capacity. The permits
are closely linked to the risks of not achieving the Water Framework Directive’s
goal of “good quantitative status”, i.e. implying that the level of groundwater in the
groundwater bodies is such that the available groundwater resource is not exceeded
by the long-term average rate of abstraction. This implies that issued exploitation
licences are operated in such a way that they comply with the good status objectives
(i.e. restrictions may be imposed in case of water scarcity).
7.3.4 The Challenge of Exempt Uses
Permit or licence-exempt groundwater uses can be a significant governance issue,
in that they escape many standard legal controls, and may pose a cumulatively
significant draw on the resource. Dealing with the potential impacts of such uses has
been a particular issue in the western US and Australia (Bracken 2010; Sinclair
Knight Merz et al. 2010). The particular end uses that are exempt from the general
requirement to obtain a permit or licence vary from place to place. Uses of
groundwater for domestic use and livestock watering are an important use category
that rarely requires a permit in Australia and the western US (Bracken 2010;
Sinclair Knight Merz et al. 2010).
In addition to the problem of many small exempt uses, sometimes even large
individual uses of groundwater are exempt from regular groundwater licensing or
permitting processes. An important example is groundwater produced as a
by-product of extracting coal seam gas, or CSG (also known as coalbed methane).
CSG production has raised concerns in relation to its groundwater impacts in both
the western US and Australia (National Research Council (U.S.). Committee on
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Management and Effects of Coalbed Methane Development and Produced Water in
the Western United States 2010; Nelson 2012b). Petroleum and gas legislation in
the Australian state of Queensland, where much of Australia’s CSG production
occurs, explicitly enables CSG producers to withdraw an unlimited amount of
groundwater as part of their CSG activities, without requiring a water entitlement
(section 185(3), Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004). The same
position was recently reversed in Colorado after a state Supreme Court decision
(Vance v. Wolfe, 205 P.3d 1165 (Colorado 2009)). Similar issues have arisen in
other western states (Klahn and Tuholske 2010; Valorz 2010).
7.3.5 The Challenge of a Human Right to Water
Whereas exempt groundwater uses can challenge groundwater governance by
evading regular controls, nascent concepts of a human right to water could add
further complexity to groundwater administration by conferring a different sort of
special status on select groundwater uses. There are many areas of uncertainty in the
meaning and practical implementation of a human right to water, in general (Good
2011). Regardless of the jurisdiction, key issues in relation to operationalising a
human right to water will be its possible fiscal implications, the precise obligations
that it creates, on whom, and how the right would be enforced (Thor 2013). A
human right to water seems likely to attach to relatively small uses, like direct
consumption and sanitation, which likely already benefit from permit-exempt status
in many areas. Accordingly, new governance issues associated with the right seem
more likely to be associated with groundwater quality, than groundwater quantity.
An exception to this might be situations in which large-scale groundwater pumping
for other uses affects the availability of water sources that are used to satisfy the
human right to water. In any case, a human right to water is an emerging issue
which each of the focus regions will likely need to address in the future.
Internationally, various political statements acknowledge a “right to water”,
including a resolution by the UN General Assembly (Thor 2013). Our focus regions
take different approaches to this issue. There is no explicit reference to a human
right to water in EU law but the first recital to the Water Framework Directive says
“Water is not a commercial product like any other but, rather, a heritage which must
be protected, defended and treated as such”, which is an implicit reference to human
rights and principles of sustainability. Similarly, in Australia, a human right to
water is not thought to be recognised at the federal level, but it has been argued that
it could include principles of sustainability that would have a bearing on ground-
water management, were it recognised (Good 2011).
California law has been more explicit. The state recently recognised a right to
water in statute (Assembly Bill 685, codified as California Water Code } 106.3),
though its formulation is relatively weak. AB 685 declares that it is state policy that
every human being has the right to clean, affordable, and accessible water for
human consumption, cooking, and sanitary purposes. However, the only duty that
AB 685 imposes is a duty of “relevant” state agencies to “consider” the state policy
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on the human right to water when revising, adopting, or establishing policies,
regulations, and grant criteria. It does not expand any state obligation to provide
water, require the development of additional water infrastructure, or create an
enforceable right for water system customers to demand immediate access to safe
and affordable water. Though the precise legal implications of the law are not yet
clear, recent focus on the lack of access to clean water of many disadvantaged
communities in California, who rely on contaminated groundwater (Salceda
et al. 2013), promises that it will be an important area of future legal development.
7.3.6 The Challenge of Connecting Groundwater Abstraction
to Surface Water and Ecosystems
Integrating different elements of the environment, institutions, and actors is a noted
challenge in water and environmental law (Klein 2005; Godden and Peel 2010;
Thompson 2011). A particular challenge for groundwater law is how to deal with
the relationship between groundwater and surface water—specifically, how
abstraction of one should be controlled due to impacts on the other—particularly
where these connections are affected by significant technical uncertainty. In gen-
eral, the key issue is how groundwater pumping impacts rivers (though
withdrawing surface water may also affect groundwater systems). A major related
challenge is making legal provision for integrating groundwater with its environ-
ment, that is, making legal provision for ecological water requirements, thereby
extending the now well-established concept of protected in-stream flows to ground-
water. In most jurisdictions, this is an emerging and unsettled area of law, which
seeks to address the water requirements of species and ecosystems that depend
entirely on groundwater, as well as those that are associated with streams that
receive water from groundwater-derived baseflow. The experiences of our focus
jurisdictions demonstrate that key issues in determining a regulatory response to
integrating groundwater, surface water and ecosystems will be determining trade-
offs between using a complex, accurate, relatively certain, but administrative
expensive mechanism (as in some states of the western US); and using broader,
simpler, cheaper mechanisms, which offer arguably less certain results (as in
Australia).
Western US mechanisms for integrating groundwater and surface water are
arguably the most developed of the focus regions. They are also probably the
most expensive to administer, since they require case-by-case technical
assessments. Many western US states establish a threshold for the maximum
proportion of the water withdrawn by a well that is predicted to be captured from
a river over a certain period of time. States differ radically in the degree to which
they will permit groundwater pumping to “impair” surface water rights. The
relevant proportion in Colorado, for example, is 0.1 % of the annual pumped
volume within 100 years of continuous withdrawal (Hobbs Jr 2010). Oregon, on
the other hand, adopts a default threshold assumption that a well would usually
cause substantial interference with a river if it is located less than a mile from the
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river, and derives 25 % of the withdrawal from the river within 30 days (Oregon
Administrative Rules } 690-009-0040). States that have low regulatory thresholds
for acceptable impairment of surface water rights tend to use flexible market-type
mechanisms to enable groundwater pumpers to offset these impacts, and thereby
meet the regulatory requirements for having their development proceed.
By contrast with protections for surface water rights, protections for (GDEs) are
at a very early stage of development in the western US. They are achieved chiefly
by way of principle-based thresholds for impairment, such as a “public interest” test
for granting a groundwater permit that can include protections for fish and wildlife
(e.g. Idaho Administrative Code } 37.03.08.045(e)(ii), North Dakota Century Code
} 61-04-06(4)(c)). With more development, the public trust doctrine—which in
most states applies only to certain surface waters, rather than groundwater—could
provide a promising route to protecting GDEs (Craig 2010; Spiegel 2010).
Protections for GDEs in the Blue Mountains, New South Wales
Not far from the suburban sprawl of Sydney, Australia, lie the Blue
Mountains, which have attained World Heritage status on account of their
biodiversity values, cultural values, geodiversity, water production, and wil-
derness values. A key threat to the area’s GDEs, particularly hanging
swamps, comes in the form of new groundwater wells. The sensitivity of
the ecosystems have warranted not only a ban on commercial wells in the
Blue Mountains Sandstone Groundwater Management Area in 2007, but also
short-term restrictions on the use of existing wells (NSW Office of Water
2011). Most significantly, given the generally high degree of reverence for
domestic use of groundwater (see ‘The challenge of exempt uses’), the Water
Sharing Plan for the Greater Metropolitan Region Groundwater Sources
(Sydney Basin Blue Mountains Groundwater Source) bans the granting or
amending of bore approvals within 100 m of listed, high priority GDEs in the
case of “bores used solely for extracting basic landholder rights”, and 200 m
for other uses; generally within 40 m from streams; and within 100 m from
the top of an escarpment (clause 41).
Australian jurisdictions tend to use simpler volumetric or spatial thresholds to
protect GDEs, such as clear drawdown limits or no-go zones for new wells around
high-priority GDEs (see text box); or volumetric limits on groundwater pumping in
a basin, where the limit is calculated to take into account acceptable impacts on
rivers or other GDEs (Tomlinson 2011; Nelson 2013). In rare cases, caps on
consumptive water use or rules that prevent extraction in response to water level
triggers may cover both surface water and groundwater, where interaction effects
happen over relatively short time-frames (e.g. Government of New South Wales
2010; Goulburn-Murray Water 2011). A further form of protection is offered by
broad statutory considerations, such as requirements to have regard to environmen-
tal impacts when a decision-maker is considering a licence application (Nelson
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2013). These approaches tend to require less case-by-case technical analysis than in
the western US, but may offer less certain local protections, either because they
apply at a macro level (e.g. large-scale volumetric limits), or because their
requirements are not specified in detail (e.g. broad statutory considerations).
The EU’s Water Framework Directive addresses groundwater-surface water
interactions by incorporating connections in its key goal: achieving “good quanti-
tative status” implies that impacts of pumping groundwater should not result in
alteration of status of associated surface waters or in any damage in groundwater-
dependent terrestrial ecosystems. This regulatory mechanism is, in principle, well
established. The extent to which it has been achieved will be evaluated in 2015 in
consideration of these possible impacts.
7.3.7 The Challenge of Connecting Groundwater Abstraction
Across Boundaries
In addition to integrating different water sources and users, groundwater law
frameworks also face the significant challenge of dealing with groundwater man-
agement in the cross-boundary context. This manifests, first, as rules for sharing
cross-boundary aquifers; and second, as an allocation of responsibility for surface
water depletions experienced in one jurisdiction, caused by upstream pumping of
connected groundwater in another jurisdiction. Our focus regions illuminate several
regulatory options for making these connections: proactive formal legal
arrangements designed to prevent conflict, which may or may not involve creating
a new regional institution; litigation to resolve conflicts; or, in some cases, a lack of
coordinated management.
In the western US, litigation-based solutions to cross-boundary groundwater
issues tend to be relatively common, and pro-active formal legal arrangements, at
least at the interstate level, fairly rare. In particular, the impact of pumping
groundwater on interstate rivers has been a key issue subject to significant liti-
gation. Lengthy litigation has dealt with how groundwater pumping affects surface
water delivery obligations under multiple interstate agreements, which do not
explicitly deal with groundwater (Hathaway 2011; Thompson 2011). In some
cases, this litigation has resulted in multi-million dollar damages being paid by
upstream groundwater pumping states to downstream states. Such litigation in some
cases has been followed by comprehensive management arrangements that seek to
avoid similar problems recurring, including integrated surface water-groundwater
technical models and monitoring programs. This litigation has proven to be a key
driver of intrastate efforts to integrate the management of groundwater and surface
water (Nelson 2012a).
Although litigation-based management of transboundary groundwater-surface
water resources has proven the norm in the western US, the recent agreement
between eight US states and two Canadian provinces governing management of
the Great Lakes, and connected groundwater and tributaries takes a promising,
different approach (Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources
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Compact, effective 2008). The Compact applies to “Waters of the Basin”, which are
defined to include tributary groundwater (Article 103). The Compact establishes a
central authority for management and implementation, and applies a common
“decision-making standard” in relation to signatories regulating water uses within
their territories (Article 203), but at the same time, grants them a relatively high
degree of autonomy (Hall 2006).
In shared groundwater basins in the western US, which lack the complexity of
highly connected surface water, “divided administration is the status quo” (Daven-
port 2008). Major interstate aquifers, like the High Plains Aquifer System (which
includes the Ogallala Aquifer) underlying parts of South Dakota, Nebraska,
Wyoming, Colorado, Kansas, Oklahoma, New Mexico, and Texas, are
administered by each state under separate arrangements. There is no formal coor-
dination of the sort found in interstate river basin commissions or compact
arrangements (Sophocleous 2010; Hathaway 2011), and no Supreme Court liti-
gation to apportion the groundwater (Leshy 2008a). Rather, a situation of “de facto
groundwater allocation” through “a combination of unilateral actions and lack of
action” occurs in many basins, for example the Hueco Bolson Basin underlying
New Mexico, Texas and Mexico; in others, some mechanisms like data sharing
exist, but cooperation is notably lacking (Hathaway 2011, p. 106). Commentators
have noted that interstate groundwater conflicts are developing, particularly where
groundwater use is growing (Hathaway 2011).
Australia’s management challenges in relation to transboundary aquifers are
relatively simple, since it lacks international groundwater boundaries and has
relatively few states. The most significant aquifer that crosses interstate boundaries
is the Great Artesian Basin, the world’s largest artesian basin (Mackay 2007).
Coordinated management of the basin occurs under the Great Artesian Basin
Coordinating Committee, which has a largely advisory role, rather than regulatory
functions. Its main focus has been a scheme to fund the capping of artesian wells
that previously were allowed to run freely, causing a loss in aquifer pressure
(Mackay 2007). At a smaller scale, a groundwater border agreement between the
states of Victoria and South Australia, for example, controls depletion of a
non-recharged aquifer by bores other than stock and domestic bores by setting
zone-based caps on extraction and drawdown (Schedule 1, Groundwater (Border
Agreement) Act 1985 (Victoria)). It takes effect through state-level licensing
decisions within a 40 km-wide cross-border area of the aquifer, which must be
made consistent with the Agreement.
The EU Water Framework Directive deals with interjurisdictional groundwater
issues in a notably more proactive and structured way than has been the case in
either Australia or the western US. It requires Member States to establish interna-
tional river basin districts, thus requiring cross-boundary cooperation for overall
water management, including groundwater (article 13, items 2). It also recommends
Member States to establish appropriate coordination with non-EU countries in river
basins crossing the boundaries of the EU (this is however not as strict as the first
regulation, as the article says: the Member States “shall endeavour to establish
cooperation”) (article 13, item 3). This is the only reference to cross-boundary
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aquifer situations concerning quantity aspects. In addition to this, the Groundwater
Directive (daughter directive to theWFD) requests Member States to coordinate the
establishment of threshold values (groundwater quality standards) in bodies of
groundwater within which groundwater flows across a Member State’s boundary.
Similarly to the WFD, it also recommends (“shall endeavour”) coordination with
non-EU countries sharing a transboundary aquifer for the establishment of ground-
water quality standards (threshold values).
7.4 Controlling Discharges of Pollution to Groundwater
Groundwater quality is a subject matter that regulation often treats separately to
groundwater quantity. This occurs despite the physical connections between
groundwater quantity and quality: polluting groundwater effectively reduces the
quantity of usable groundwater, and pumping groundwater can cause quality
problems in the form of spreading contaminant plumes and seawater intrusion.
Groundwater quality and quantity are regulated under very different frameworks in
Australia and the western US. This section briefly describes these frameworks, and
introduces the EU’s more integrated approach to controlling polluting discharges to
groundwater. Key elements of regulatory frameworks for groundwater quality are
setting quality goals, and regulating potentially polluting activities to achieve those
goals—both point and diffuse sources of pollution.
7.4.1 Macro-Level Groundwater Quality Goals
Jurisdictions in each of our focus regions differ in the goals that they set for
groundwater quality, the methods of setting those goals, and divisions of regulatory
responsibility. In the EU, the goal and definition of “good chemical status” are
given in the Water Framework Directive (article 2, item 25 and Annex V,
Table 2.3.2) and elaborated in a “daughter directive” which was adopted in 2006
(Directive 2006/118/EC). In this context, the compliance regime is based on quality
objectives (compliance with relevant standards, no saline intrusion) that have to be
achieved by the end of 2015. The direction chosen is based on compliance with
EU-wide groundwater quality standards (covering nitrates and pesticides) which
reinforce the parent directives (i.e. the standards are to be applied across the EU).
Regarding other pollutants, the adoption of numerical values at Community level
was not considered to be a viable option, considering the high natural variability of
substances in groundwater (depending upon hydrogeological conditions, back-
ground levels, pollutant pathways, and interactions with different environmental
compartments). Consequently, the regime of the “daughter” Groundwater Directive
requests Member States to establish their own groundwater quality standards
(referred to as “threshold values”), taking identified risks into account and a list
of substances given in an annex to the Directive. Threshold values must be
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established for all pollutants that characterise groundwater bodies at risk of not
achieving the good chemical status objective and this should be done at the most
appropriate level, e.g. national, river basin district or groundwater body level. They
concern not only pollutants that may be naturally present in groundwater but also
synthetic pollutants. Regarding compliance, evaluation will be based on a compar-
ison of monitoring data with numerical standard values (EU-wide groundwater
quality standards and/or threshold values set by individual Member States).
In contrast to the EU’s single, comprehensive legislative approach to regulating
groundwater pollution, the US federal approach has been characterised as an
inadequate “patchwork” (Thomas 2009). In relation to groundwater, the main US
federal approach has been to regulate key activities that have the potential to pollute
groundwater, as described below, rather than to set quality standards, for which it
provides in the case of surface water under the Clean Water Act. A form of macro-
level control is adopted, though, under the Safe Drinking Water Act. That Act
provides for setting “maximum contaminant levels” for public water supply
sources. In addition, its “sole source aquifer” program provides for the designation
of aquifers that are the sole or principal source of drinking water for an area. The
federal government may not fund a project that may contaminate such an aquifer,
endangering public health. Under the Safe Drinking Water Act, states must also
develop wellhead protection programs to prevent pollution near wellfields that
provide public drinking water (Sax et al. 2006). A small number of US state laws
mirror the Clean Water Act’s approach to surface water protection, prohibiting the
discharge of pollutants into groundwater (Thomas 2009). Australia’s federal
groundwater quality policy echoes, and has been influenced by, these approaches.
In Australia, the role of the federal government in groundwater quality is largely
restricted to recommending policy, undertaking joint planning with states, and
offering funding (Nelson 2011a). Though groundwater quality—mainly salinity—
has been a traditionally strong concern in many parts of Australia, a recent decade
of extreme drought ensured that most attention focused on groundwater quantity;
federal groundwater quality policy is now significantly out of date. The Guidelines
for Groundwater Quality Protection in Australia (GGQPA), a component of the
National Water Quality Management Strategy, were published in 1995, and recent
reviews have recommended that they be updated (Nelson 2010; Sundaram
et al. 2010). Separate policies apply to protecting groundwater quality in specific
contexts, such as managed aquifer recharge, the application of recycled water and
drinking water standards. The basic approach promoted in the GGQPA is to assess a
groundwater resource, set beneficial uses for the resource and accompanying
quantitative or qualitative criteria, develop protection measures, and undertake
monitoring (Chap. 5, GGQPA; Nelson 2010). Australian states shoulder the
major regulatory burden in relation to groundwater quality. Goals for environmen-
tal quality (including groundwater quality) are generally set out in state-level
environment protection policies, which may be binding or non-binding. They
typically aim to protect region-specific “beneficial uses” or “environmental values”
of the groundwater, consistent with national policy.
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7.4.2 Micro-Level Controls: Diffuse and Point Sources
Jurisdictions commonly control the discharge of point-source pollutants to ground-
water, but controls over diffuse sources of pollution uniformly have proven more
challenging. In the EU, the compliance regime of the Groundwater Directive
implies that values of groundwater quality standards (threshold values) should not
be exceeded at any monitoring points in groundwater bodies. However, it opens the
possibility for exceeding concentrations at one or more monitoring points providing
that an appropriate investigation shows that the exceeding concentrations (e.g. point
source pollution) are not considered to present a significant environmental risk, nor
endanger the uses of groundwater. In addition, Member States are required to assess
the impacts of existing plumes of pollution in groundwater bodies that may threaten
their overall quality objectives, in particular plumes resulting from point sources
and contaminated land. The Directive requests Member States to carry out trend
assessments for identified pollutants in order to verify that plumes from
contaminated sites do not expand, do not deteriorate the chemical status of the
groundwater body (or bodies in case of grouping) and do not present a risk to
human health and the environment. Non-legally binding guidance documents are
used to guide Member States on assessing the condition of groundwater and related
matters (e.g. European Commission 2007; Quevauviller 2008; European Commis-
sion 2009).
In Australia, macro-level groundwater quality goals are operationalised through
pollution licensing processes, which generally apply only to point sources. State
laws regulate potentially polluting activities, often requiring that an authorisation to
undertake such an activity only be granted consistently with, or considering,
legislative instruments that set out the beneficial uses of groundwater (e.g. section
47(1)(e) Environment Protection Act 1993 (South Australia)). Water allocation
planning processes may also include a requirement to consider beneficial uses
(e.g. Tasmania Department of Primary Industries and Water 2009). Economic
incentives to minimise pollution also appear in state laws in the form of fees for
environmental authorisations that reward best practice (regulations 5CA, 5EA,
Environment Protection Regulations 1987 (Western Australia)) and tradeable
emissions schemes (e.g. Parts 9.3A Protection of the Environment Operations Act
1997 (New South Wales)). State laws (as opposed to policies or funding programs)
dealing with non-point source pollution take several forms, but are much less
developed than those for point sources. They can appear as general statutory duties
not to pollute the environment or cause environmental harm, supported by codes of
conduct or “best practice” guidelines for non-point source activities; and statutory
matters that land use planners must consider when faced with land use decisions.
Voluntary guidelines, codes of conduct and self-regulatory approaches tend to be
used more commonly, in practice, than mandatory obligations (Nelson 2011a).
Remedial measures take the form of environment protection or abatement orders
(Bates 2006).
As alluded to above, the US federal government’s key water quality legislation,
the Clean Water Act, does not apply to groundwater in terms of licensing point
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source discharges, though this is a somewhat contentious matter in relation to
groundwater that is hydrologically connected to navigable waters, which are cov-
ered (Thomas 2009; Makowski 2012). Rather, the potential for groundwater pollu-
tion is addressed by a collection of federal legislation that applies to particular
activities that may pollute groundwater. The federal Safe Drinking Water Act
applies to licensing underground injection activities, including aquifer storage;
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act regulates solid waste including
hazardous waste, and applies to underground storage tanks; and the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act deals with remediating
past contamination using a strict liability approach (Sax et al. 2006). Non-point
sources historically have been dealt with using voluntary control measures, but
there is evidence that federal encouragement of states to use more rigorous enforce-
ment mechanisms is producing promising results (Nelson 2011a).
At the state level, jurisdictions take a variety of approaches to seeking to prevent
groundwater pollution. California provides an example of a state that is generally
regarded as having a promising approach to non-point source groundwater pollu-
tion, in particular. Its Porter-Cologne Water Quality Control Act gives the state
direct power to regulate nonpoint sources, including agriculture. Regional water
quality control plans set out water quality objectives and beneficial uses; waste
discharges are subject to either general (based on discharge category) or
individualised requirements based on the relevant basin plan and other factors
(sections, 13241, 13263 California Water Code). Any person discharging waste,
including from non-point sources, must report the discharge and pay an annual fee,
unless a waiver applies (section 13260, California Water Code). Unfortunately, the
temptation to grant waivers to agricultural non-point polluters has historically been
irresistible (Nelson 2011a; Smith and Harlow 2011). More recently, examples of
stronger controls on agricultural non-point source pollution of groundwater have
arisen, notably requirements for certain categories of farms to have a farm water
quality management plan, monitor and report on groundwater conditions, monitor
and report on discharges, and have a nutrient management plan (California
Regional Water Quality Control Board Central Coast Region 2012). Concerns
over nitrate pollution have been instrumental in driving this approach (California
Regional Water Quality Control Board Central Coast Region 2012).
7.5 Conclusion
This chapter sets out a framework of key issues that arise in groundwater law, with
an emphasis on regulatory approaches adopted in the western US, Australia, and the
EU. It will be apparent that these regions, and the jurisdictions within them, differ in
many ways in their approaches to groundwater law—both controlling groundwater
extraction and controlling discharges of pollution to groundwater. These
differences begin at the most basic level of defining what groundwater is and who
should regulate it, and establishing limits to groundwater withdrawal and
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groundwater pollution at the level of the basin and of individual users and polluters,
respectively.
It is not possible to deem any one approach universally most effective or
desirable for all situations, and we do not attempt to do so. We do, however, suggest
a series of key issues that are likely to pose challenges to effective groundwater
management, and that decision-makers should consider in establishing, evaluating,
and revising their groundwater laws. In the experience of our three focus regions,
these basic challenges include: dealing with groundwater uses that are exempt from
licensing requirements; interpreting and applying the emerging notion of a human
right to water; connecting groundwater abstraction to impacts on surface water and
ecosystems; connecting groundwater abstraction across boundaries; and dealing
with both diffuse and point sources of pollution.
While some of these issues have been of regulatory concern for some time,
others have arisen over only several years, more recently. Despite the many
differences between jurisdictions, they have one regulatory requirement in com-
mon: groundwater law must continue to evolve and adapt to newly emerging and
dynamic challenges in groundwater management in order to effectively manage
groundwater quantity and quality, now and in the future.
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